

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 03012 01 OF 04 140617Z
ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-14 AF-04 EUR-08 DHA-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 INR-05 L-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 PA-01
PM-03 PRS-01 SP-02 SSO-00 INRE-00 ACDA-10 NEA-07
EA-06 ARA-06 /078 W
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O P 140449Z SEP 77
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5341
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USUN 3012

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, US, SF, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: CONTACT GROUP MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 13/DRAFT
TALKING POINTS OF WITHDRAWAL FOR MEETING WITH SAG

REF: PRETORIA 4715

1. SUMMARY. CONTACT GROUP MET PM SEPTEMBER 13 AND TENTATIVELY
ACCEPTED PROPOSAL (REFTEL) THAT NEXT ROUND OF TALKS WITH SAG
BE HELD IN PRETORIA FROM SEPTEMBER 22-23. CONTACT GROUP
FURTHER DISCUSSED TALKING POINTS ON QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL
FOR UPCOMING TALKS WITH SAG. THIS DISCUSSION EXPOSED THE
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PAGE 02 USUN N 03012 01 OF 04 140617Z

STILL-PRESENT PROBLEM THAT THE CONTACT GROUP HAS NOT YET
REACHED A JOINT CONCEPTION OF THE APPROPRIATE NATURE AND
FUNCTION OF A UN MILITARY PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA. THE CONTROVERSY
CENTERS AROUND THE SIZE AND NATURE OF UN MILITARY PRESENCE AND
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A UN MILITARY PRESENCE
WOULD IN ADDITION TO ITS PRIMARY MONITORING FUNCTIONS HAVE
SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. IN CONTRAST TO THE VIEW OF US MEMBERS OF CONTACT GROUP THAT SIZE MUST BE DICTATED BY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THAT ONE OF ITS SECONDARY FUNCTIONS IS MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER, THE BRITISH AND CANADIANS OPPOSE ANY SUCH RESPONSIBILITY. REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S VIEW ON THIS MATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END SUMMARY.

2. WESTERN FIVE CONTACT GROUP MET PM SEPTEMBER 13 AND AGREED TO ACCEPT PROPOSAL (REFTEL) THAT NEXT ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN CONTACT GROUP AND SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TAKE PLACE IN PRETORIA FROM SEPTEMBER 23 TO 23; HOWEVER, SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT YET BE INFORMED OF DECISION AS WE HAVE NOT LOOKED INTO TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS. FURTHER, CONTACT GROUP AGREED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE FOR A MEETING WITH SWAPO IN SOUTHERN AFRICA FOLLOWING PROPOSED CONTACT GROUP MEETING WITH SAG.

3. CONTACT GROUP THEN PROCEEDED TO CONSIDER TALKING POINTS ON QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL FOR UPCOMING TALKS WITH SAG. FOLLOWING (PARA 7) ARE TALKING POINTS WHICH EXISTED AT CONCLUSION OF CONTACT GROUP MEETING. THESE TALKING POINTS WERE ACCEPTED WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE PARAGRAPH (TICK 5, POINT 4) WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:
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PAGE 03 USUN N 03012 01 OF 04 140617Z

SUFFICIENT UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD BE INTRODUCED TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING TASKS:

- A) MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE;
- B) MONITORING THE CONFINEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL;
- C) MONITORING THE BORDERS;
- DL MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER -- A TASK WHICH IS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE POLICE;
- E) ASSISTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NAMIBIA ARMY."

4. THE SIZEABLE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THIS PARAGRAPH CONCERNS BOTH THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PRESENCE AND CENTERS ON ITEM (D) OF THE PARAGRAPH. THE BRITISH AND CANADIANS INSIST ON ALTERING ITEM (D) TO READ "MONITORING THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER -- A TASK WHICH IS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE POLICE." THIS REFLECTS: A) THE BRITISH REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE NOTION OF A UN MILITARY PRESENCE WHICH HAS AN ACTIVE MILITARY FUNCTION FOR FEAR THAT IT WILL TOO CLOSELY RESEMBLE A PEACEKEEPING FORCE; AND B) THE CANADIAN APPREHENSION THAT A UN MILITARY PRESENCE WITH MORE THAN A MONITORING OR OBSERVING FUNCTION WILL BE UNACCEPTABLY EXPENSIVE. THE

BRITISH AVERSION TO THE NOTION OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS
SO STRONG THAT THEY OBJECT EVEN TO THE DESCRIPTION OF A
UN MILITARY PRESENCE AS A UN MILITARY FORCE. THE FRENCH SEEMED
TO SUPPORT THE UK POSITION. WHILE THE
GERMANS HAD NO STRONG VIEWS ON THIS POINT,
IT IS OUR VIEW THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE
UN MILITARY PERSONNEL TO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAIN-
TAINING LAW AND ORDER, IN THE EVENT THAT IT CANNOT BE
MAINTAINED BY THE POLICE. IF SUCH RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT
GRANTED, A SIZEABLE AND UNCONTROLLED CIVIL DISTURBANCE
COULD RESULT IN THE REINTRODUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICA
TROOPS AND THUS THE DEMISE OF THE SETTLEMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03012 02 OF 04 140644Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 USUN 3012

LIMDIS

5. ACCOMPANYING THE DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS WITHIN
THE CONTACT GROUP AS TO THE FUNCTION OF THE UN MILITARY
PRESENCE IS A LACK OF AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE STRUCTURE AND SIZE
OF THE UN MILITARY PRESENCE. BECAUSE THE BRITISH AND
CANADIANS OBJECT TO THE UN'S ASSUMPTION OF A SECONDARY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER, THEY SEE NO

NEED FOR THE EXISTENCE OF UNITS WHICH WOULD FULFILL THAT RESPONSIBILITY. RATHER THEY ENVISION THE UN MILITARY PRESENCE AS CONSISTING OF SCATTERED MONITORS AND OBSERVERS. WE, ON THE OTHER HAND, BELIEVE THE ADDITIONAL EXISTANCE OF SUCH UNITS IS NECESSARY AND WILL FURTHER SERVE TO DETER THE OUTBREAK OF ANY LARGE CIVIL DISTURBANCES.
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03012 02 OF 04 140644Z

WITH REGARD TO THE SIZE OF THE UN MILITARY PRESENCE, NONE OF US HAVE A SOLID CONCEPTION OF HOW LARGE IT WILL HBE TO BE; NEVERTHELESS, THE BRITISH AND CANADIANS APPEAR TO ENVISION A UNIT OF 800 AND 200, RESPECTIVELY. BOTH MIGHT AGREED TO ABOUT 1,000. OUR VIEW IS THAT THE SIZE OF THE UN MILITARY PRESENCE SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT OF ITS ROLE AND THAT NO MAXIMUM LIMIT SHOULD NOW BE CONCEIVED OF EVEN INFORMALLY. THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN POSITIONS HERE AGAIN REFLECT THE BRITISH AVERSION TO ANYTHING REMOTELY RESEMBLING A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE (THE BRITISH HAVE DO NOT YET SUPPORT THEIR RHODESIA PROPOSALS.) AND THE CANADIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH COST. BOTH UNDOUBTLY ARE AWARE OF LIKELY SOUTH AFRICAN AVERSION TO A LARGE UN FORCE. WE ARE NOT INSENSITIVE TO THESE CONSIDERATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE COST FACTOR. BUT THE OBJECT IS AN ACCEPTABLE AND WORKABLE SOLUTION RATHER THAN IDEOLOGICAL BLINDERS.

6. THE DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS WITHIN THE CONTACT GROUP OF THE APPROPRIATE ROLE, STRUCTURE, AND SIZE OF THE UN MILITARY PRESENCE WILL HAVE TO BE SETTLED BEFORE THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND WITH SWAPO. REQUEST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON THIS MATTER, WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED BY CONTACT GROUP AGAIN AS SOON AS VIEWS OF CAPITALS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED.

7. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TALKING POINTS AS THEY EXISTED AT CONCLUSION OF CONTACT GROUP MEETING SEPTEMBER 13:

SECURITY

-- WE WISH TO RECALL THAT ON FOUR OCCASIONS WE RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES
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PAGE 03 USUN N 03012 02 OF 04 140644Z

FROM NAMIBIA. THESE WERE:

1) DURING FIRST ROUND OF TALKS. APRIL 29 NON-PAPER

STATES:

TRANSFER OF POWER. IN CONSULTATION WITH THESE MAINLY INVOLVED, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD DEVELOP A PLAN FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL IN STAGES FROM NAMIBIA TO PREPARE A SMOOTH TRANSFER OF POWER AT THE END OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. (THIS PLAN WOULD CLEARLY HAVE A NUMBER OF FINANCIAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.)

2) DURING SECOND ROUND OF TALKS. JUNE 10 NON-PAPER STATES:

WE ASKED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, IN CONSULTATION WITH THOSE MAINLY CONCERNED, TO MOVE QUICKLY TO DRAW UP PLANS FOR A PHASED TRANSFER OF POWER/WITHDRAWAL WHICH SHOULD TAKE PLACE, PROGRESSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, BEGINNING WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL.

TO FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE, TWO STEPS ARE ESSENTIAL:

- A) THE UN REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED IN ALL PHASES OF THE PLAN;
- B) THE WITHDRAWAL MUST BE COMPLETED BY INDEPENDENCE, SUBJECT TO WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS THE NEW NAMIBIA GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE MADE FOR FUTURE.

3) DURING JULY 14 DEMARCHE BY PRETORIA AMBASSADORS. TALKING POINTS FOR THAT DEMARCHE READ:

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRESENCE. THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IS A MAJOR AREA OF DISPUTE. IT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 03012 02 OF 04 140644Z

IS ARGUED THAT FREE ELECTIONS CANNOT BE HELD AS LONG AS SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES REMAIN IN NAMIBIA. EVEN AS REGARDS A PHASED WITHDRAWAL IT IS BEING ARGUED THAT IT IS TOO MUCH TO EXPECT OTHERS TO RENOUNCE THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY AS LONG AS ANY SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES REMAIN IN THE TERRITORY SINCE OTHERS CONCERNED, JUST LIKE SOUTH AFRICA, ARE UNDERSTANDABLY FEARFUL OF THE RISKS IN THE CASE OF A BREAKDOWN IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. INDEED, SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE THAT A U.N. FORCE MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO BALANCE OR REPLACE THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA. THE FIVE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT DEVISING THE MEANS TO MEET THESE CONCERS WILL PROVE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. RECENT STATEMENTS BY FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA TEND TO IMPLY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WILL NOT START UNTIL A NEW NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT

TAKES POWER. THIS APPROACH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE IN THE VIEW OF THE FIVE WHO MADE IT CLEAR DURING THE LAST ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS THAT WITHDRAWAL SHOULD TAKE PLACE PROGRESSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEGINNING WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL.

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03012 03 OF 04 140714Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 USUN 3012

LIMDIS

(1) THE FIVE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT IF THEIR INITIATIVE IS TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA COMMUNICATE TO THEM AT AN EARLY DATE A SCHEDULE FOR A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM NAMIBIA. SUCH A SCHEDULE SHOULD INVOLVE EARLY AND SUBSTANTIAL TROOPS REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BEGIN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSTALLATION OF THE U.N. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. IT IS UNDERSTOOD FROM OUR EARLIER DISCUSSIONS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO SATISFY HIMSELF REGARDING GUARANTEES AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF INTIMIDATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 03012 03 OF 04 140714Z

FROM WHATEVER QUARTER (INCLUDING THE ARMED FORCES).

4. DURING AUGUST 1 DEMARCHE BY PRETORIA AMBASSADOR

TALKING POINTS FOR THE DEMARCHE READ:

A PHASED PLAN OF WITHDRAWAL AND THE QUESTION OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN NAMIBIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD CONSTITUTES A CENTRAL PROBLEM. OUR POINTS OF DEPARTURE IN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL IS THAT ONCE THE PARTIES CONCERNED HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PEACEFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, THE THREAT TO SECURITY SHOULD BE GREATLY DIMINISHED. OUR REFERENCE TO INTIMIDATION" FROM WHATEVER QUARTER (INCLUDING THE ARMED FORCES)" APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MISCONSTRUED. WE ARE OF COURSE OPPOSED TO INTIMIDATION FROM ANY QUARTER WHATSOEVER. INDEED, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WILL RECALL THAT OUR ORIGINAL FORMULATION, DURING THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS IN CAPE TOWN SPOKE OF INTIMIDATION FROM POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ARMED FORCES. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MUST RECONGNIZE, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION TO WHICH WE ARE ADDRESSING OURSELVES: THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ARE EXPECTING SWAPO AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES TO AGREE TO TAKE PART IN PEACEFUL ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA, WHILE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS REMAIN IN THE TERRITORY. THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO FEARS IN MANY QUARTERS OF UNDUE INFLUENCE DURING THE POLITICAL PROCESS, AND OF UNDUE ADVANTAGE IN THE EVENT OF ITS BREAKDOWN.

IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS PARTIES, WE HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S READINESS TO ACCEPT AN APPROACH WHICH INVOLVED GUARANTEES DURING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 03012 03 OF 04 140714Z

POLITICAL PROCESS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF INTIMIDATION FROM WHATEVER QUARTER. WE HAVE ALREADY URGED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO DRAW UP PLANS FOR A PHASED WITHDRAWAL TO TAKE PLACE PROGRESSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEGINNING WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS SHOULD INCLUDE A SCHEDULE FOR A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM NAMIBIA, WITH EARLY AND SUBSTANTIAL TROOPS REDUCTIONS. WITH THIS, AND AGREEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICAN TO PUT THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL

SCHEDULE INTO EFFECT, WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO INSIST THAT SWAPO AGREE TO CEASE THE USE OF ARMED FORCE.

IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS IS TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING THE FUNCTIONS OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE VARIOUS POLITICAL FACTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ASSURE THE FREEDOM OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THAT CONFIDENCE WILL AFFECT REACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ANY SOUTH AFRICAN TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS AND AFFECT AS WELL THE LEVEL OF THE UN PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA AND THE ROLES IT WILL PLAY.

IN THE ADDITION, WE REPORTED TO YOU ON THE DISCUSSION OF THIS ASPECT WITH SWAPO.

-- THE ISSUE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES FROM NAMIBIA AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE FOR SECURITY IS FUNDAMENTAL TO ACHIEVEMENT OF AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT TO THE NAMIBIA QUESTION.

-- AS WE SEE IT THE VARIOUS POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

1. ONE SIDE INSISTS THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM NAMIBIA PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 03012 03 OF 04 140714Z

OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING FOR THE ELECTION OF AN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO DRAW UP A CONSTITUTION.

2. THEY ARGUE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY IS AN ILLEGAL ARMY OF OCCUPATION AND THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS CANNOT BE HELD IN THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES.

3. THEY RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF PROVISIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER AND FOR ASSURANCE THAT ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED WILL BE FAIRLY AND FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED. HOWEVER, THEY REJECT THAT THIS FUNCTION CAN OR SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY SOUTH AFRICA.

4. THEY ALSO HOLD THAT THESE FUNCTIONS CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY ETHNICALLY-BASED NAMIBIAN TROOPS OR GROUPS THAT THESE ARE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY UNITS; THAT THEY ARE A FURTHER STEP TOWARD ENTRENCHMENT ON THE VERY BASIS WHICH THE UN HAS REJECTED AND WHICH IS ONE OF THE ISSUES THE PEOPLE ARE TO DECIDE THROUGH AN ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY; THAT THEY ARE ANTI-SWAPO; AND THAT IN THE LONG-TERM ETHNIC FORCES PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A WEAK DECENTRALIZED NAMIBIA, POSSIBLY WITH CIVIL OR TRIBAL WARFARE.

5. RATHER, THEY ARGUE THAT THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

CALLS FOR THE PRESENCE OF UNITED NATIONS CONTINGENTS TO
CONVINCE AN APPREHENSIVE PEOPLE THAT THEY INDEED CAN VOTE
FREELY, TO ASSURE THE POPULATION, PARTICULARLY THE WHITES,
THAT LAW AND ORDER WILL BE MAINTAINED, AND THAT OTHER
TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS A CEASEFIRE ARE FULLY
IMPLEMENTED.

B. SOUTH AFRICA

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE CONCERNS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
GOVERNMENT AND OF THOSE NAMIBIANS WHOSE VIEWS THE GOVERNMENT
REFLECTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

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PAGE 05 USUN N 03012 03 OF 04 140714Z

1. THESE MUST BE AN ASSURANCE WITH SWAPO, POSSIBLY
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF CUBA FORCES STATIONED IN ANGOLA, WOULD
NOT SIMPLY MARCH INTO (OR INFILTRATE) NAMIBIA AND PREVENT THE
HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN OVAMBOLAND WHERE THE
MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION IS CONCENTRATED.

2. SOUTH AFRICA MAY ALSO SPECULATE THAT THE INSTA-
LATION IN NAMIBIA OF WHAT IT CONSIDERS A HOSTILE GOVERNMENT
WOULD HAVE GRAVE SECURITY CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03012 04 OF 04 140701Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 USUN 3012

LIMDIS

3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT FEELS A RESPONSIBILITY AND INDEED HAS GIVEN CERTAIN ASSURANCES TO RESIDENTS OF NAMIBIA THAT AN ORDERLY TRANSITION WILL TAKE PLACE AND THAT LIFE AND PROPERTY WILL BE PROTECTED.

4. SUBSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES BY PEACEKEEPING FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS VIEWED WITH DISTRUST ON THE GROUNDS EITHER THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IS NOT NEUTRAL OR THAT UN FORCES WOULD NOT STAND UP TO A DETERMINED SWAPO.

AS A RESULT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENT POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL WOULD APPEAR TO BE AS FOLLOWS:
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PAGE 02 USUN N 03012 04 OF 04 140701Z

A. SOUTH AFRICA HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ITS MILITARY FORCES TO BE COMPLETED BY INDEPENDENCE UNLESS THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF NAMIBIA SHOULD DECIDE OTHERWISE.

B. HOWEVER, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SINCE APRIL THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE CONTACT GROUP TO DRAW UP, FOR DISCUSSION, A PLAN FOR THE PHASED AND PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES BUT NO PLAN HAS BEEN SUBMITTED.

C. ON THE CONTRARY, SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS SEEM TO IMPLY THAT LITTLE OR NO WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES SHOULD TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT -- POSSIBLY IN THE BELIEF THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL ASK SOUTH AFRICA TO REMAIN.

D. TO THE EXTENT THAT SOUTH AFRICA SEEMS WILLING TO WITHDRAW SOME OF ITS FORCES, IT IS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ETHNICALLY, BASED NAMIBIAN FORCES AND SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO ELECT NAMIBIAN CITIZENSHIP WILL CONSTITUTE THE NEW ARMY IN NAMIBIA.

-- IT IS DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE THE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE TWO SIDES EVEN IF QUESTIONS OF LEGALITY ARE SET ASIDE:

RECONCILIATION IS MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE PROFOUND
SUSPICION WITH WHICH SOUTH AFRICA'S INTENTIONS ARE VIEWED.
IN ADDITION THERE IS SOUTH AFRICA'S SUSPICION OF UN PEACE-
KEEPING FORCES, WHO NORMALLY WOULD BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENTLY
NEUTRAL SO AS TO PROVIDE A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS.
AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE EXPRESS
POSITION OF NEITHER SIDE CAN BE FULLY MET. OUR TASK, THEN,
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 USUN N 03012 04 OF 04 140701Z

IS TO ESTABLISH A PLAN FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WHICH
TRIES TO MEET THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF EACH SIDE.

-- THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY EACH SIDE ENABLE US TO
IDENTIFY A NUMBER OF SECURITY-RELATED FUNCTIONS WHICH MUST
BE PERFORMED IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND THE PERIOD
IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. THESE ARE:

A) TO OBSERVE AND ENFORCE A CEASEFIRE;
B) TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF NAMIBIA'S BORDERS TO
AS (1) TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO INFILTRATION OR
UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO THE COUNTRY; AND (2) TO ENSURE THAT
THOSE NAMIBIANS WHO WISH TO DO SO CAN RETURN PEACEFULLY AND
WITHOUT INTIMIDATION AT DESIGNATED ENTRY POINTS.

C) TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO INTIMIDATION FROM ANY
QUARTER;

D) TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER;

E) TO MONITOR AGREEMENTS RELATING TO MILITARY
WITHDRAWAL; AND

F) TO DEVELOP A NAMIBIAN MILITARY FORCE.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN FOR SECURITY IN NAMIBIA DURING THE
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

1. BOTH PARTIES WOULD ENTER INTO A CEASEFIRE WHICH WOULD
BE OBSERVED AND MONITORED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.
 2. THE MILITARY FORCES OF EACH SIDE WOULD BE CONFINED
TO PRESENTLY ESTABLISHED BASES.
 3. THERE WOULD BE PROGRESSIVE CONSOLIDATION AND WITHDRAWAL
OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES TO SOUTH AFRICA AT PHASED INTERVALS
SPREAD EQUALLY OVER A PERIOD OF 5 MONTHS (FROM THE DATE
OF THE CEASEFIRE) LEAVING A SMALL CONTINGENT CONFINED
AT GROOTFONTEIN. THAT CONTINGENT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ELECTION FOR THE CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY.
 4. SUFFICIENT UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD BE
- CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 03012 04 OF 04 140701Z

INTRODUCED TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING TASKS:

(A) MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE;

(B) MONITORING CONFINEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL;

(C) MONITORING THE BORDERS;

(D) MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER -- A TASK WHICH IS THE
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE POLICE;

(E) ASSISTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NAMIBIAN ARMY,

5. THE ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL IN COOPERATION WITH THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL DETERMINE WHICH AND UNDER WHAT
CONDITIONS EDUCATIONAL, MEDICAL, AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER
SERVICES CURRENTLY PERFORMED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL
SHOULD BE CONTINUED.

6. ALL ETHNIC NAMIBIAN FORCES WOULD BE DISBANDED. IN THE
CASE OF THE BUSHMEN, WHO REPORTEDLY LIVE ON BASE WITH THEIR
FAMILIES, THE UNITS WOULD BE DEACTIVATED AND DISARMED
AND SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICERS WITHDRAWN. FAMILIES WOULD BE
PERMITTED TO REMAIN AT BASE PENDING FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS.
YOUNG

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 14-Sep-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977USUNN03012
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770332-1088
Format: TEL
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770962/aaaacanu.tel
Line Count: 621
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: de4c4046-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 77 PRETORIA 4715
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1269639
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NAMIBIA: CONTACT GROUP MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 13/DRAFT TALKING POINTS OF WITHDRAWAL FOR MEETING WITH SAG
TAGS: PORG, US, SF, WA
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/de4c4046-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009